
An Introduction to Microarchitectural Attacks

Jan Reineke

Based on slides kindly provided by Yuval Yarom, The University of Adelaide and Data61 Ruhr University Bochum



Abstraction Layers

High-level Languages Compiler		Illusion (ISA)	Reality (mArchitecture)
Assembly Assembler	Hardware	Dedicated	Shared
Machine Code	Memory	Uniform	Non-uniform
Operating System	Execution	Serial	Superscalar
Instrution Set Architectur (SA) implements Microarchitecture realite realize		etween abst	d breathes in the raction layers. ullien (@halvarflake)

CPU vs. Memory



Processor Speed Memory Latency

1 MHz

500 ns




8*2600 MHz



Bridging the gap

Cache utilises locality to bridge the gap


- Divides memory into *lines*
- Stores recently used lines
- In a *cache hit,* data is retrieved from the cache
- In a cache miss, data is retrieved from memory and inserted to the cache





Cache Consistency

- Memory and cache can be in inconsistent states
 - Rare, but possible
- Solution: Flushing the cache contents
 - Ensures that the next load is served from the memory












FLUSH+RELOAD [YF14]

- FLUSH memory line
- Wait a bit
- Measure time to **Reload** line
 - slow-> no access
 - fast-> access
- Repeat






Memory


The RSA Encryption System

• The RSA encryption is a public key cryptographic scheme




Key Generation:


- Select random primes p and q
- Calculate N = pq
- Select a public exponent e(=65537)
- Compute $d=e^{-1} \mod \varphi(N)$
- (*N*, *e*) is the public key
- (p, q, d) is the private key



GnuPG 1.4.13 Exponentiation



Flush+Reload on GnuPG 1.4.13




The FLUSH+RELOAD Technique

- Leaks information on victim access to shared memory.
- Spy monitors victim's access to shared code
 - Spy can determine what victim does
 - Spy can infer the data the victim operates on

Set Associative Caches

- Memory lines map to *cache sets*. Multiple lines map to the same set.
- Sets consist of *ways*.
 A memory line can be stored in **any** of the ways of the set it maps to.
- When a cache miss occurs, one of the lines in the set is *evicted*.



The Prime+Probe Attack [OST06]

- Allocate a cache-sized memory buffer
- Prime:

fills the cache with the contents of the buffer

- Probe:
 - measure the time to access each cache set
 - Slow access indicates victim access to the set
- The probe phase primes the cache for the next round





Memory


Sample Victim: Data Rattle

}

```
volatile char buffer[4096];
```

```
int main(int ac, char **av) {
  for (;;) {
    for (int i = 0; i < 64000; i++)
      buffer[800] += i;
    for (int i = 0; i < 64000; i++)
      buffer[1800] += i;</pre>
```

Cache Fingerprint of the Rattle Program



Real Victim – AES

	<pre>static const u32 Te0[256] = {</pre>
<pre>\$0 = GETU32(in) ^ rk[0];</pre>	0xc66363a5U, 0xf87c7c84U, 0xee777799U, 0xf67b7b8dU,
S1 = GETU32(in + 4) + [K[1];	0xfff2f20dU, 0xd66b6bbdU, 0xde6f6fb1U, 0x91c5c554U,
$s2 = GETU32(in + 8) ^ rk[2];$	0x60303050U, 0x02010103U, 0xce6767a9U, 0x562b2b7dU,
$s3 = GETU32(in + 12) ^ rk[3];$	0xe7fefe19U, 0xb5d7d762U, 0x4dababe6U, 0xec76769aU,
<pre>#ifdef FULL_UNROLL</pre>	0x8fcaca45U, 0x1f82829dU, 0x89c9c940U, 0xfa7d7d87U,
/* round 1: */	0xeffafa15U, 0xb25959ebU, 0x8e4747c9U, 0xfbf0f00bU,
t0 = Te0[s0 >> 24D ^ Te1[(s1 >>	0x41adadecU, 0xb3d4d467U, 0x5fa2a2fdU, 0x45afafeaU,
t1 = Te0[si >> 24] ^ Te1[(s2 >>	0x239c9chfll 0x53a4a4f7ll 0xe4727296ll 0x9bc0c05bll
t2 = Te0[s2 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s3 >>	
t3 = Te0[s3 >> 24] ^ Te1[(s0 >>	
/* round 2: */	
	16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[8];
	16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t3 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t0 & 0xff] ^ rk[9];
	16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t0 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t1 & 0xff] ^ rk[10];
	<pre>16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t1 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t2 & 0xff] ^ rk[11];</pre>
/* round 3: */	<pre>16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[s3 & 0xff] ^ rk[12];</pre>
	16) & $0xff$] ^ Te2[(s2 >> 8) & $0xff$] ^ Te3[s0 & $0xff$] ^ rk[13];
	16) & $0xff$] ^ Te2[(s0 >> 8) & $0xff$] ^ Te3[s1 & $0xff$] ^ rk[14];
	16) & $0xff$] ^ Te2[(s1 >> 8) & $0xff$] ^ Te3[s2 & $0xff$] ^ rk[15];
/* round 4: */	
	<pre>16) & 0xff] ^ Te2[(t2 >> 8) & 0xff] ^ Te3[t3 & 0xff] ^ rk[16];</pre>

AES T-table access

static	const u32	Te0[256] = {		
0x0	:66363a5U,	0xf87c7c84U,	0xee777799U,	0xf67b7b8dU,
0xf	ff2f20dU,	0xd66b6bbdU,	0xde6f6fb1U,	0x91c5c554U,
0x6	60303050U,	0x02010103U,	0xce6767a9U,	0x562b2b7dU,
0ve	7fofo1011	0vh5d7d76211	Qv/dahahe611	Avec76760all

- Assume we know the plaintext and the index (s0>>24)
 - We can recover the most significant byte of the key

AES T-tables and cache lines

static const u32 Te0[256] = {

			$[e0[256] = \{$	static const u32
	0xf67b7b8dU,	0xee777799U,	0xf87c7c84U,	0xc66363a5U,
Cache Line 0	0x91c5c554U,	0xde6f6fb1U,	0xd66b6bbdU,	0xfff2f20dU,
	0x562b2b7dU,	0xce6767a9U,	0x02010103U,	0x60303050U,
	0xec76769aU,	0x4dababe6U,	0xb5d7d762U,	0xe7fefe19U,
	0xfa7d7d87U,	0x89c9c940U,	0x1f82829dU,	0x8fcaca45U,
Cache Line 1	0xfbf0f00bU,	0x8e4747c9U,	0xb25959ebU,	0xeffafa15U,
	0x45afafeaU,	0x5fa2a2fdU,	0xb3d4d467U,	0x41adadecU,
	0x9bc0c05bU,	0xe4727296U,	0x53a4a4f7U,	0x239c9cbfU,
	0x4c26266aU,	0x3d9393aeU,	<pre>0xe1fdfd1cU,</pre>	0x75b7b7c2U,
Cache Line 2	0x83cccc4fU,	0xf5f7f702U,	0x7e3f3f41U,	0x6c36365aU,
	0xf9f1f108U,	0xd1e5e534U,	0x51a5a5f4U,	0x6834345cU,
	0x2a15153fU,	0x62313153U,	0xabd8d873U,	0xe2717193U,
	0x9dc3c35eU,	0x46232365U,	0x95c7c752U,	0x0804040cU,
Cache Line 3	0x2f9a9ab5U,	0x0a05050fU,	0x379696a1U,	0x30181828U,
Cache Line 5	0xdfe2e23dU,	0x1b80809bU,	0x24121236U,	0x0e070709U,
	0xea75759fU,	0x7fb2b2cdU,	0x4e272769U,	0xcdebeb26U,
	0x341a1a2eU,	0x582c2c74U,	0x1d83839eU,	0x1209091bU,
Cache Line 4	0x5ba0a0fbU,	0xb45a5aeeU,	0xdc6e6eb2U,	0x361b1b2dU,
Cache Line 4	0x7db3b3ceU,	0xb7d6d661U,	0x763b3b4dU,	0xa45252f6U,
	0x13848497U,	0x5e2f2f71U,	0xdde3e33eU,	0x5229297bU,
	<pre>0xc1eded2cU,</pre>	0×00000000U,	0xb9d1d168U,	0xa65353f5U,
Cache Line 5	0xb65b5bedU,	0x79b1b1c8U,	<pre>0xe3fcfc1fU,</pre>	0x40202060U,
Cache Line 5	0x7239394bU,	0x67bebed9U,	0x8dcbcb46U,	0xd46a6abeU,
	0x85cfcf4aU,	0xb05858e8U,	0x984c4cd4U,	0x944a4adeU,
	0xedfbfb16U,	0x4faaaae5U,	0xc5efef2aU,	0xbbd0d06bU,
	0x11858594U,	0x66333355U,	0x9a4d4dd7U,	0x864343c5U,
	0xfe7f7f81U,	0x04020206U,	0xe9f9f910U,	0x8a4545cfU,
	Av/haQaQaQII	0v250f0fhall	Av783c3c4411	0va05050f011

AES T-tables and cache lines

			$Te0[256] = {$	static const u32
	0xf67b7b8dU,	0xee777799U,	0xf87c7c84U,	0xc66363a5U,
Cache Line 0	0x91c5c554U,	0xde6f6fb1U,	0xd66b6bbdU,	0xfff2f20dU,
	0x562b2b7dU,	0xce6767a9U,	0x02010103U,	0x60303050U,
	0xec76769aU,	0x4dababe6U,	0xb5d7d762U,	0xe7fefe19U,
	0xfa7d7d87U,	0x89c9c940U,	0x1f82829dU,	0x8fcaca45U,
Cache Line 1	0xfbf0f00bU,	0x8e4747c9U,	0xb25959ebU,	0xeffafa15U,
	0x45afafeaU,	0x5fa2a2fdU,	0xb3d4d467U,	0x41adadecU,
	0x9bc0c05bU,	0xe4727296U,	0x53a4a4f7U,	0x239c9cbfU,
	0x4c26266aU,	0x3d9393aeU,	<pre>0xe1fdfd1cU,</pre>	0x75b7b7c2U,
Cache Line 2	0x83cccc4fU,	0xf5f7f702U,	0x7e3f3f41U,	0x6c36365aU,
	0xf9f1f108U,	0xd1e5e534U,	0x51a5a5f4U,	0x6834345cU,
	0x2a15153fU,	0x62313153U,	0xabd8d873U,	0xe2717193U,
	0x9dc3c35eU,	0x46232365U,	0x95c7c752U,	0x0804040cU,
	0x2f9a9ab5U,	0x0a05050fU,	0x379696a1U,	0x30181828U,


- If 0≤plaintext^key<16, Cache Line 0 is accessed.
- What if plaintext^key≥16?

Prime+Probe Attack on AES

s0 = plaintext ^ key
t0 = Te0[s0>>24]


- For many plaintexts do: Prime, Encrypt, Probe
- Calculate the average probe time of each cache set as a function of the plaintext value
- Extract key from results

PP Attack on AES - Results



PP Attack on AES – More Results

plaintext[5..8]



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Other Techniques (a very partial list)

- Evict+Time [OST06]
- Branch prediction [AKS06, ERAP18,...]
- L1-I Prime+Probe [Aci07]
- LLC Prime+Probe [LYG+15, IES15]
- Flush+Flush [GMWM15]
- CacheBleed [YGH17]
- TLBleed [GRBG18]
- PortSmash [CBH+18]
- SPOILER [IMB+19]

OpenSSL

LOW Severity. This includes issues such as those that ... or hard to exploit timing (side channel) attacks.

https://www.openssl.org/policies/secpolicy.html

- Attacks are easy, but at the same time
 - Publications are terse technical details are often omitted
 - Generic tools do not exist

Mastik

Extremely bad acronym for


Micro-Architectural Side-channel ToolKit


- Original Aims
 - Collate information on SC attacks
 - Improve our understanding of the domain
 - Provide somewhat-robust implementations of all known SC attack techniques for every architecture
 - Implementation of generic analysis techniques
 - Reduce barriers to entry into the area
 - Shift focus to cryptanalysis

Current Status

- Reasonably robust implementation of six attacks
 - Prime+Probe on L1-D, L1-I and L3
 - Flush+Reload
 - Flush+Flush
 - Performance degradation
- Only Intel x86-64, on Linux and Mac (limited)
 - x86-32 and limited ARM currently working in the lab
- Zero documentation, little testing
- Little user feedback

https://cs.adelaide.edu.au/~yval/Mastik/





No need to program


FR-trace -s 2000 -c 100000 -f ./gpg \

- -m mpih-mul.c:85 \
- -m mpih-mul.c:271 \
- -m mpih-div.c:356

Speculative Execution Attacks

Microarchitectural channels

Program execution leaves traces
 inside the processor



• We believe that hardware is working correctly. It is therefore the responsibility of software that processes sensitive material to introduce the appropriate countermeasures. (Intel)

> adc \\$0,%rdx add \$A[0],\$N[0] adc \\$0,%rdx mov \$N[0],24(\$tp) mov %rdx,\$N[1]

Instruction Pipelining

- Nominally, the processor executes instructions one after the other
- Instruction execution consists of multiple steps
 - Each uses a different unit

Instruction Instruction Fetch Decode	Argument Fetch	Execute	Write Back
---	-------------------	---------	------------

_	
mulq	\$m0
add	%rax,\$A[0]
mov	
	32(\$tp),\$tp
	\\$0,%rdx
	%rdx,\$A[1]
mulq	
	%rax,\$N[0]
	8(\$a,\$j),%rax
adc	\\$0,%rdx
add	\$A[0],\$N[0]
adc	\\$0,%rdx
	\$N[0],-
24(\$t	
	%rdx, \$N[1]
mulq	
	%rax,\$A[1]
	8*1(\$np),%rax
	\\$0,%rdx
	%rdx,\$A[0]
mulq	
	%rax,\$N[1]
mov	(\$a,\$j),%rax
mov	8(\$a,\$j),%rax
adc	\\$0,%rdx
	•

Instruction Pipelining

- Nominally, the processor executes instructions one after the other
- Instruction execution consists of multiple steps
 - Each uses a different unit
- Pipelining increases utilisation by executing steps of multiple instructions

Instruction Fetch	Instruction Decode	Argument Fetch	Execute	Write Back
Instruction Fetch	Instruction Decode	Argument Fetch	Execute	Write Back
Instruction Fetch	Instruction Decode	Argument Fetch	Execute	Write Back
Instruction Fetch	Instruction Decode	Argument Fetch	Execute	Write Back
Instruction Fetch	Instruction Decode	Argument Fetch	Execute	Write Back


			,	1	
С	Ξ	a	/	b; 5:	
Р	=	С	+	5:	1

mov lea	<pre>%rax,\$A[0] 8*2(\$np),%rax 32(\$tp),\$tp</pre>
adc mov add adc add adc mov mov mulq add mov	<pre>\\$0,%rdx %rdx,\$A[1] \$m1 %rax,\$N[0] 8(\$a,\$j),%rax \\$0,%rdx \$A[0],\$N[0] \\$0,%rdx \$N[0],-24(\$tp) %rdx,\$N[1] \$m0 %rax,\$A[1] 8*1(\$np),%rax</pre>
adc mov mulq add mov mov adc	<pre>\\$0,%rdx %rdx,\$A[0] \$m1 %rax,\$N[1] (\$a,\$j),%rax 8(\$a,\$j),%rax \\$0,%rdD</pre>

• Problem: dependencies

Out-of-order execution

• Execute instructions when data is available rather than by program order



$$c = a / b;$$


d = c + 5;

e = f + g;

- Completed instructions wait in the reorder buffer until all previous instructions are retired
- Why not retire immediately?

Out-of-order execution

• Execute instructions when data is available rather than by program order



$$c = a / b;$$

 $d = c + 5;$

- e = f + g;
- Completed instructions wait in the reorder buffer until all previous instructions are retired
- Why not retire immediately?

Out-of-order execution is speculative!

Speculative execution


 Abandon instructions in the reorder buffer if never executed in program order

IF	ID	AF	EX	WB
IF	ID	AF	EX	WB
IF	ID	AF	EX	WB

• Also useful for handling branches


Speculative Execution and Branches

- When execution reaches a branch
- The processor predicts the outcome of the branch
- Execution proceeds (speculatively) along predicted branch
- Correct prediction \rightarrow all is well
- **Misprediction** \rightarrow abandon and resume




Branch Prediction

- Branch History Buffer (BHB)
 - Outcome of conditional branches
 - Does the program tend to take this



- Branch Target Buffer (BTB)
 - Target of indirect branches
 - Where does the program usually go from here?




Main Discovery

- Abandoned speculative execution leaves traces in the microarchitecture
- Developed techniques to implement a covert channel from the abandoned code to the attacker





Attack overview







Meltdown
























Spectre (Variant 2)






How deep does the rabbit hole go?

- Variant 3a: leak model-specific registers
- "The processor is, in fact, operating as it is designed,"
 Smith said. "And in every case, it's been this side-channel approach that the researchers used to gain information even while the processor is executing normally its intended functions." (Intel)
- Fallout: read data from the store buffer






Countermeasures



Compiler patches to block speculative execution


- Use static ana

ars TECHNICA SPOOKY SPOOKY SPECTRE Microsoft's compiler-level Barriers at eve Spectre fix shows how hard this problem will be to solve Investigation of Microsoft's compiler changes show that much of the ETER BRIGHT - 2/15/2018, 8:19 AN






Meltdown



Strict site isolation



• Limit memory access or use of data

```
if (x < array_len) {
    i = array[x];
    y = array2[i * 256];
    v = array2[i * 256];
}</pre>
```

- Reduce timer frequency
 - Also disable features such as SharedArrayBuffers

Conclusions

- Decades of focus on performance with little regard to security bring us Spectre and Meltdown
 - This is not much different to software development
 - -... but it's harder to fix

- Likely to affect computer security for a long time
 - We do not understand the full implications yet
- Microarchitectural channels matter